Corrections log, September 2026
58 entries, newest first. Each is also noted, with its date, on the post it changes. How we correct errors, the newest entries and every other month are on the corrections page.
Corrected
The Party Realignment: How Democrats and Republicans Changed Over Time: An earlier version of this post said the South moved from presidential voting to congressional politics, "then state legislatures and local offices," in the Stage 5 text and the key takeaways. We found no source for local offices, and both now end at state legislatures, which a study of Southern elections (McKee) shows following Congress. The 1968 caption and timeline entry said Wallace carried "five Deep South states"; the five were Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana and Mississippi, and both now say five Southern states and name them. The 1932 caption and timeline entry said the South voted Democratic "alongside northern urban centers," which no source cited here supports; both now give the National Archives' state results: Roosevelt carried every former Confederate state and every state but six. The 1964 caption and timeline entry said the Deep South broke toward Goldwater while the rest of the country voted heavily Democratic; Goldwater also carried Arizona, his home state, and both now say so. The update of the same date that cites a source for the 1964 result calls its wording unchanged; the Arizona change was made after that update.
Corrected
The State of the 2026 Economy: Why It Feels Worse Than the Data: An earlier version of this post said "paycheck-to-paycheck can reach well into six-figure households in high-cost regions." We found no source for "well into", and the Federal Reserve survey now cited does not break its figures out by region. The post now gives what the survey found: in 2024, 22% of adults with family income of $100,000 or more spent about as much as their income in the prior month, and 12% spent more. It also said many insured families "delay care, skip specialist visits, or take on medical debt." The survey measures care people went without, not care they delayed, so the post now says they skip care, including visits to a doctor or specialist, or take on medical debt, and gives the same survey's figures: 26% of insured adults went without some medical care in 2024 because they could not afford it, and 17% of all adults had medical debt. And it said that "a large share of imports are inputs into domestic production" and that sweeping tariffs "can raise costs for U.S. firms as much as they raise sticker prices for households." The Congressional Budget Office's outlook, which the post cites, estimates that foreign exporters absorb 5 percent of tariff costs and that the 95 percent borne in the United States reaches consumers: in the near term, businesses absorb 30 percent of their import price increases and pass 70 percent on, and competing domestic producers raise their prices enough that, on net, consumer prices rise by the full 95 percent. The post now says that many imports are used as inputs in domestic production, so sweeping tariffs raise costs for U.S. firms as well as sticker prices for households, and cites CBO.
Clarified
Should Religious Institutions Pay Taxes? A $100B Transparency and Opportunity Cost Case: Three statements are now more precise. The post said many churches are not required to file the same annual public financial disclosures as comparable nonprofits; under IRS rules no church has to file the annual information return (Form 990 or 990-EZ) that other tax-exempt organizations must generally file once their receipts normally exceed $50,000, and the post now says so. The working estimate of $100 billion was labeled as 2026 dollars in three places: the key takeaways, the working-estimate line and the stat row. By CPI-U it is the 2012 estimate in 2025 dollars, about $103 billion at August 2026 prices, and all three now say so. The SNAP line assumed $2,500 per recipient-year; benefits averaged $187.94 per participant per month in fiscal year 2025 (USDA Economic Research Service), about $2,255 a year, so the assumption is on the high side and its count of about 40 million recipient-years on the low side (about 44 million at the actual average). That assumption and its count are unchanged.
Corrected
Should Religious Institutions Pay Taxes? A $100B Transparency and Opportunity Cost Case: Three statements were wrong or had no source. The source line under the 2024 lobbying figures repeated the counts the post first gave, 18 clients and 58 lobbyists, which cannot be confirmed; it now gives the counts OpenSecrets shows, 21 and 62. The housing voucher line assumed an "all-in" annual public cost of $12,000 per household. HUD's 2024 budget request put voucher renewals at $27.8 billion for about 2.3 million households, plus $3.2 billion in administrative fees, so the all-in cost was about $13,500 per household; $12,000 is close to the renewal cost alone (about $12,100). The line no longer says "all-in" and gives HUD's figures. The health center section called $1,200 per patient-year "a conservative benchmark." No source supports that: KFF reports $49.6 billion in health center revenue for 32.4 million patients in 2024, about $1,530 per patient, so $1,200 is below what health centers spend and its count of about 83 million patient-years is high. The post now calls $1,200 an assumption and gives the KFF comparison, about 65 million patient-years at $1,530.
Clarified
Is Universal Basic Income Inevitable?: This post said federal low-income programs differ by "eligibility, application processes, recertification, and enforcement," and that a raise can leave a household worse off "when a household loses multiple benefits at once." Its sources support narrower wording. The post now says programs differ by eligibility, application processes and the conditions for staying eligible, as the Government Accountability Office reports, and that a raise leaves a household no better off, or worse off, when the benefits it loses equal or exceed the raise, which is how the Department of Health and Human Services defines a benefit cliff.
Corrected
The Party Realignment: How Democrats and Republicans Changed Over Time: Three of the four chart images did not match their sources, and the fourth depended on one of them. The two Black party identification charts began in 1948; the American National Election Studies (ANES) series, which they now use, begins in 1952. The second chart's caption credited a post-1964 rise in strong Democratic identification; that share jumped in 1964 and 1968, fell back, and rose again from 2008. The South's Republican presidential vote chart was off by up to 3.5 points; it now uses MIT Election Data and Science Lab (MEDSL) returns: 49.7% in 1992, including D.C. The gap chart now uses MEDSL's House returns. The text said the presidential-minus-House gap held near 10 points through the 1970s and 1980s and closed only after 1994; it was 8.6 to 19.7 points from 1976 to 1988, 2.9 in 1992, and between -4.3 and 2.4 from 1996 to 2016. A 1980 caption calling the South a reliable Republican bloc was also corrected.
Corrected
Why Local Journalism Is a National Security Issue: An earlier version of this post said Russian operatives in 2016 created fake local news sites promoting divisive content. The Senate Intelligence Committee found that the Internet Research Agency ran Twitter accounts designed to look like local news aggregators, such as @OnlineMemphis and @TodayPittsburgh, which posted links to legitimate news sources and tweeted about local issues. The post now says that, and the table of threats says accounts, not sites.
Corrected
Why Local Journalism Is a National Security Issue: An earlier version of this post said studies find "higher rates of misappropriated public funds," "increased cost overruns on public projects" and "higher rates of candidates with previously undisclosed scandals," and that incumbents are reelected more often "even when incumbents are ineffective." We found no study behind these four statements; the study cited on incumbents finds more reelections but does not assess how incumbents performed. The first two are replaced by what the Gao, Lee and Murphy paper found: higher government wages and deficits, and more costly borrowing choices. The other two are cut. The opening said that within months of the Vindicator's closing, city spending irregularities and school board controversies went unreported and local elections featured candidates nobody had scrutinized. No source supports this, and it is cut; the opening now cites a 2020 University of North Carolina report that Youngstown was the first city of any size in the country to lose its sole surviving daily newspaper. The post said that during Hurricane Maria local reporters tracked power, water and passable roads, national media left after a week, and local journalists stayed, documenting recovery failures that became a national scandal. It now says what news reports support: the only radio station on the air through the storm relayed messages between families, and a lawsuit by CNN and Puerto Rico's Center for Investigative Journalism led to the release of partial death records. The post also said national media "parachutes in for a day before leaving"; it now says local reporters are still there after national crews move on.
Clarified
The State of the 2026 Economy: Why It Feels Worse Than the Data: When this post was published on March 15, 2026, it gave the 13% average tariff rate for the end of 2025 without noting that on Feb. 20, 2026, the Supreme Court had ruled in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the President to impose tariffs, or that the IEEPA tariffs had then been removed. The post now says the 13% rate is for the end of 2025 and adds the ruling. The 13% figure is unchanged.
Clarified
How AI Is Reshaping Small Businesses (Not Just Big Tech): An earlier version of this post said most AI tools are subscription-based. We found no source for "most." The post now says many AI tools can be used free or for a low monthly subscription fee, as a November 2025 OECD report on small firms and generative AI puts it, and cites that report.
Clarified
SAVE Act: Costs, Burdens, and Benefits Compared: An earlier version of this post said that even sources often cited to argue that noncitizen voting is a problem tend to imply a low incidence at national scale, and that worker churn increases error rates. Neither statement had a source, and the Heritage Foundation, the example given, reads its map the other way. The post now says such sources do not measure how often it happens, gives Heritage's own reading, and says churn raises the risk of errors, citing a 2024 Votebeat report on Pennsylvania.
Clarified
SAVE Act: Costs, Burdens, and Benefits Compared: The statement that audits, prosecutions and post-election reviews generally find very low levels of documented noncitizen voting had no source. Its wording is unchanged, and the post now adds a sentence with two examples: Georgia's 2024 citizenship audit found 20 noncitizens among 8.2 million registered voters, as reported by the Associated Press, and in the Kansas case the federal courts found at most 67 noncitizens registered or attempted to register over 19 years.
Clarified
Corrections Reform: What Works, What Fails, and What It Costs: An earlier version of this post said, without a source, that many returns to custody are technical violations and destabilization cascades, not new violent crimes, and that substance use disorder and serious mental illness are overrepresented in incarcerated populations. The sources now cited support narrower statements, and the post now makes those. The CSG Justice Center's Confined and Costly finds that technical violations of probation or parole, such as missing appointments or failing drug tests, account for nearly 1 in 4 state prison admissions; it does not say whether the other returns involve violent crimes. Two Bureau of Justice Statistics reports find drug dependence or abuse, and serious psychological distress, far more common among prisoners and jail inmates than in the general population; serious psychological distress is a survey measure, not a diagnosis of serious mental illness.
Corrected
Corrections Reform: What Works, What Fails, and What It Costs: An earlier version of this post said, in the reentry section and the "What works" table, that the first weeks after release are a high-risk window, and framed reentry around "predictable failure points" and "the common breakdowns immediately after release." We found no source for these, and the cited sources do not make them. The post now omits the high-risk window statement and describes reentry support as addressing practical obstacles after release.
Clarified
Why Prescription Drugs Cost More in the U.S. (and What Actually Lowers Prices): Two passages were broader than their sources. The post said Medicare Part D was created in 2006; the law was enacted earlier, and coverage began January 1, 2006, so the post now says Part D began in 2006. The descriptions of Germany, the U.K. and Canada said Germany uses reference pricing when negotiations fail, that a U.K. manufacturer must meet a price threshold, and that Canada uses reference pricing to keep prices near peer norms. The post now describes each system as the Commonwealth Fund's country profiles do: Germany negotiates prices with health funds after a new drug's added benefit is assessed, the U.K.'s NICE assesses cost-effectiveness, and Canada's provinces negotiate jointly while a federal board regulates the introductory prices of patented medicines.
Corrected
Why Prescription Drugs Cost More in the U.S. (and What Actually Lowers Prices): An earlier version of this post said Germany uses reference pricing when price negotiations fail. When talks fail, an arbitration board sets the price, using European price levels as its standard; reference prices apply to new drugs found to add no benefit. The post now says so, citing Germany's Federal Joint Committee.
Clarified
Why Prescription Drugs Cost More in the U.S. (and What Actually Lowers Prices): The descriptions of Germany, England and Canada now give more detail, each cited to a primary source: Germany's Federal Joint Committee, NICE's methods manual, and Canada's Patent Act and its regulations. The section on NICE was headed "United Kingdom" and now says England, because its sources describe England.
Corrected
Why Childcare Is Expensive for Parents and Still Pays Poverty Wages: An earlier version of this post said that in Illinois a median childcare worker may need to spend about 50% of earnings to put their own child in infant care. We could not find a source for that figure, so the line is removed.
Clarified
Why Childcare Is Expensive for Parents and Still Pays Poverty Wages: Two figures were given without a source. "When childcare takes 20% to 35% of take-home pay" now gives Child Care Aware of America's 2024 estimate that the national average price takes 10% of a married couple's median income and 35% of a single parent's. "Often 70% to 80% of a center's operating costs are staff compensation" now gives an estimate from the Center for American Progress, as cited by the Treasury Department, that wages alone are at least 50% to 60% of a typical provider's expenses.
Corrected
Why Childcare Is Expensive for Parents and Still Pays Poverty Wages: An earlier version of this post said childcare takes 20% to 35% of take-home pay. We could not find a source for that range. The post now gives Child Care Aware of America's 2024 estimate that the national average price takes 10% of a married couple's median income and 35% of a single parent's. The post also said, without citing a source, that staff compensation and benefits are often 70% to 80% of a center's operating costs. It now gives a sourced estimate from the Center for American Progress, as cited by the Treasury Department, that wages alone are at least 50% to 60% of a typical provider's expenses. These changes were first labeled a clarification.
Corrected
Jobs Added vs. Jobs People Want: Why the Numbers Don’t Match Reality: An earlier version of this post said post-pandemic job growth had leaned heavily toward hospitality, retail and many support roles. It cited no source, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics data at the time of the post showed otherwise: the January 2026 jobs report said health care added an average of 33,000 jobs a month in 2025 and that retail trade and leisure and hospitality changed little. The post now says growth leaned toward health care and social assistance, and cites that report.
Clarified
Jobs Added vs. Jobs People Want: Why the Numbers Don’t Match Reality: An earlier version of this post said entry-level jobs increasingly demand experience, that jobs can be added in Austin and Boise while layoffs concentrate in expensive metros, and that part-time work often means no health insurance. The first two statements had no source. The post now says employers ask for more experience when they can be selective, citing Federal Reserve Bank of Boston research on online job postings of all kinds from 2007 to 2012, and makes the geography point without naming cities. The benefits survey now cited measures access to health insurance through an employer, so the list now says no employer health insurance.
Corrected
Student Debt Explained: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions: An earlier version of this post said associate degree holders often owe $10,000 to $15,000, and it gave the other degree ranges without a source. The Congressional Research Service brief the post cites puts the average for 2019-20 associate degree recipients with federal loans at $19,500. The post now gives the brief's averages for all four degree levels: associate $19,500, bachelor's $26,400, master's $67,800 and professional doctorate $177,100.
Corrected
Student Debt Explained: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions: An earlier version of this post said state funding per full-time student remains materially below 2000 levels after inflation. The State Higher Education Executive Officers Association's report for fiscal 2024, published before this post, puts it slightly below: $11,683 per student, 1.8% less than the fiscal 2000 high of $11,902, after sharp declines during and after the Great Recession, with 22 states still below their 2008 levels. The post now gives those figures and cites that report; the earlier source's page could not be reached.
Clarified
Why Grocery Prices Still Feel High Even as Inflation Cools: An earlier version of this post said a bag of chips that used to contain 16 ounces now contains 13, and that an ice cream container shrank from half a gallon to 1.5 quarts. It named no product and cited no source, and we could not confirm either example as stated. The post now gives the Government Accountability Office's estimates of how much product downsizing added to price increases for snacks and ice cream from 2019 to 2024.
Clarified
Why Grocery Prices Still Feel High Even as Inflation Cools: An earlier version of this post said, without a source, that some households saw pay growth that beat inflation and many did not. The source now cited, the Federal Reserve's survey of household finances for 2023, does not compare each household's pay with inflation. The post now gives what it does show: in October 2023, 65 percent of adults said changes in the prices they paid had made their financial situation worse.
Corrected
Why Grocery Prices Still Feel High Even as Inflation Cools: An earlier version of this post said a bag of chips that used to contain 16 ounces now contains 13, and that an ice cream container shrank from half a gallon to 1.5 quarts. It named no product and cited no source, and we could not confirm either example as stated. The post now gives the Government Accountability Office's estimates that from December 2019 to December 2024, product downsizing added 2.6 percentage points to the rise in the Consumer Price Index for snacks and 1.8 points for ice cream. This change was first labeled a clarification.
Corrected
Housing Crisis: Supply, Demand, and Zoning Reform: An earlier version of this post said renters face the same squeeze "as landlords pass higher land and financing costs into monthly payments." It cited no source for that, and we found none that shows it. The post now says only that renters face a squeeze of their own, with nearly half of renter households cost-burdened (Census Bureau).
Clarified
Housing Crisis: Supply, Demand, and Zoning Reform: Three statements were broader than their evidence. "Across most of the country, typical incomes can no longer support typical home prices" now gives the Joint Center for Housing Studies figure it rests on: in three of every four of the 100 largest metros, typical home prices were at least four times the median household income in 2024. The statement that most residential land in "many large metros" is legally reserved for detached single-family homes, in the text and in the table "Why supply can’t meet demand", now says "cities", the unit the New York Times analysis it now cites (2019) measured: it is illegal "on 75 percent of the residential land in many American cities to build anything other than a detached single-family home." "Rent control ... can reduce new construction and maintenance" now says it can reduce the supply of rental housing and its maintenance, as the Brookings review of the evidence it now cites says.
Clarified
Impact of Tariffs on Supply Chains and Consumers: An earlier version of this post said the stated goal of the 2018 tariffs on Chinese goods "was simple: protect American manufacturing." The Trade Representative's office announced them as a response to China's trade practices on technology transfer and intellectual property, and a Federal Reserve study describes boosting manufacturing as one goal. The post now names both.
Corrected
Impact of Tariffs on Supply Chains and Consumers: An earlier version of this post captioned the laundry chart as showing prices from 1997 to 2026, and its description said "projected 2026." The chart shows the Consumer Price Index for laundry and dry cleaning services from 2004 to early 2026, with no projection. The caption now gives those dates and says the index measures laundry services, not washing machines.
Clarified
Is Universal Basic Income Inevitable?: This post said cash transfers were already expanding "through child credits, targeted cash programs, and local guaranteed income pilots," with no date or source. The sentence is now dated to March 2026 and gives its evidence: a July 2025 law, Public Law 119-21, raised the maximum federal child tax credit from $2,000 to $2,200 per child, and the Stanford Basic Income Lab describes dozens of local guaranteed income pilots, which pay cash to targeted groups, around the country.
Clarified
Corporate Conglomerates: When Scale Becomes Systemic Risk: The table of market concentration ranges said agencies describe an HHI below 1,000 as "Unconcentrated." That is the term the 1992 Merger Guidelines used. The 2023 Merger Guidelines, which the post also cites, label only the highly concentrated range (an HHI above 1,800) and give this range no label; the "moderately concentrated" label for 1,000 to 1,800 comes from the Justice Department's HHI page. The table now says so and cites the source of each label.
Corrected
Should Religious Institutions Pay Taxes? A $100B Transparency and Opportunity Cost Case: When this post ran in March 2026, it said OpenSecrets counted 18 clients and 58 lobbyists in the Clergy and Religious Organizations sector for 2024, and the update note of September 25, 2026, said OpenSecrets showed those counts at the time. Neither count can be confirmed: the Wayback Machine has no copy of OpenSecrets' 2024 sector page from on or before March 13, 2026, and its only copy, from July 16, 2026, shows 21 clients and 62 lobbyists. The post gives 21 and 62 and no longer says OpenSecrets showed 18 and 58. The $5,140,000 total the post first gave is confirmed by a March 13, 2026 archived copy of OpenSecrets' annual totals for the sector.
Corrected
SAVE Act: Costs, Burdens, and Benefits Compared: An earlier version of this post gave the Congressional Research Service explainer's title as "Safeguard American Voter Eligibility Act (SAVE Act, H.R. 22/S. 128) and Federal Voter Registration Policy and Law." CRS updated and retitled it on February 24, 2026, before this post ran: "Safeguard American Voter Eligibility Act (SAVE America Act) and Federal Voter Registration Policy and Law." The post now gives that title.
Clarified
SAVE Act: Costs, Burdens, and Benefits Compared: This post analyzes H.R. 22, the SAVE Act. It did not mention that on February 11, 2026, a month before it ran, the House passed the SAVE America Act, 218 to 213, as an amendment to S. 1383. That bill would also require documentary proof of citizenship to register, and it adds voter ID requirements for registering and voting. The post now says so, citing the CRS explainer.
Corrected
SAVE Act: Costs, Burdens, and Benefits Compared: An earlier version of this post said the Election Assistance Commission's UOCAVA reporting highlights late ballot transmission as a recurring cause of ballot rejection. The EAC page reports that in the 2010 federal elections, the most common reason a military or overseas ballot was rejected was that it was not received on time, 32% of the 14,824 rejected ballots. It does not say why the ballots arrived late. The post now gives that finding.
Corrected
Housing Crisis: Supply, Demand, and Zoning Reform: An earlier version of this post said early results of Minneapolis's 2019 zoning reform suggested "meaningful increases in permitted multifamily housing." The Bipartisan Policy Center review it cites (2023) calls the increase modest: in 2020 through 2022, Minneapolis averaged 57 permits a year for buildings with two to four units, 45% more than in 2017 through 2019, and new housing overall had not risen significantly. The post now says that.
Corrected
Housing Crisis: Supply, Demand, and Zoning Reform: Three statements cited sources that do not make them. California's increase in permitted ADUs cited a Brookings article on measuring the housing shortage, which does not discuss ADUs; it now cites the California Department of Housing and Community Development's ADU Handbook, which reports 1,336 ADUs permitted in 2016 and 30,354 in 2024. The history of exclusionary zoning and the role of local opposition in approvals cited an Urban Institute report on housing supply and prices that covers neither; they now cite the Urban Institute's report on exclusionary zoning (Greene and Ellen, 2020). The statements themselves are unchanged.
Clarified
Is Universal Basic Income Inevitable?: An earlier version of this post's case against UBI did not mention the findings of a large U.S. randomized trial of guaranteed income (Vivalt et al., NBER Working Paper 32719, 2024), which was already in its source list. The post now adds them: $1,000 a month for three years produced a moderate drop in labor supply (4.2 percentage points in labor market participation, 1 to 2 fewer work hours a week), and gains in subjective well-being in the first year faded to control group levels afterward.
Corrected
The Difference Between Oversight and Gridlock: An earlier version of this post said Senate filibuster rules require 60 votes to "pass" most legislation. Sixty votes are needed to end debate (invoke cloture) on most legislation, not to pass it. The post now says that.
Clarified
The Difference Between Oversight and Gridlock: An earlier version of this post said "Benghazi hearings lasted longer than 9/11 investigations." The sources support a narrower comparison: the House select committee on Benghazi ran from May 2014 to its final report in December 2016, longer than the 9/11 Commission, which was created in late 2002 and closed in August 2004. The post now says that.
Corrected
Why Prescription Drugs Cost More in the U.S. (and What Actually Lowers Prices): An earlier version of this post said many countries with negotiation and price constraints "still produce and adopt new medicines." The cited sources address adoption, not where drugs are produced, so "produce" is removed. The post now also notes the launch-timing finding of the report it cites (RAND for HHS ASPE, February 2024): over half of new drugs launch first in the U.S., with an average lag of about one year before they launch in another country.
Corrected
Why Childcare Is Expensive for Parents and Still Pays Poverty Wages: An earlier version of this post said the number of states where infant care costs more than public college tuition rose from 33 "before the pandemic." The 33-state figure comes from the Economic Policy Institute's analysis of 2020 data, as Stateline reports, so the post now says that. The reference list also labeled Stateline as Pew; Stateline describes itself as part of States Newsroom, and the label now says so.
Corrected
Is Universal Basic Income Inevitable?: An earlier version of this post cited a "Final Report (2021)" of the Stockton Economic Empowerment Demonstration (SEED), at a link that no longer works. The 2021 report SEED published is titled "Preliminary Analysis: SEED's First Year" (March 2021) and covers February 2019 through February 2020 only. The source list now gives that title and links to the report. The post's link to Kela's basic income experiment page, which no longer loads, is replaced with the Finnish Ministry of Social Affairs and Health's May 6, 2020 release of the experiment's results.
Corrected
Corporate Conglomerates: When Scale Becomes Systemic Risk: An earlier version of this post listed the authors of the NBER working paper "The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications" as De Loecker, Eeckhout, and Unger. The working paper version the post cites (NBER Working Paper 23687, August 2017) is by Jan De Loecker and Jan Eeckhout. The source line now names De Loecker and Eeckhout.
Corrected
Why Local Journalism Is a National Security Issue: An earlier version of this post listed "more government employees convicted of crimes" and "lower bond ratings" among the findings of studies on newspaper closures, and said nearly 200 counties had no local newspaper. The research it cites found more federal corruption charges and indicted defendants after a closure, not convictions of government employees, and found higher local government borrowing costs even after controlling for bond ratings, not lower ratings. The UNC news deserts report it cites counts more than 200 counties with no local newspaper. The post now says each of these.
Clarified
What “Algorithmic Transparency” Really Means: An earlier version of this post said uses such as real-time facial recognition surveillance and social credit scoring "might be banned." It should have said that the European Union already bans them: since February 2, 2025, before this post ran, the EU AI Act has prohibited social scoring and real-time remote biometric identification for law enforcement in publicly accessible spaces. The post now says so and cites the European Commission.
Corrected
Should Religious Institutions Pay Taxes? A $100B Transparency and Opportunity Cost Case: An earlier version of this post said the $71 billion estimate it relied on included the charitable deduction for donors, and showed an unsourced chart that split $100 billion into $45 billion for the charitable deduction, $35 billion for income and investment exemptions, and $10 billion each for property tax and the parsonage allowance. The 2012 estimate did not include the donor deduction; its authors wrote that they "did not estimate the subsidy to donors through tax deductions." Its largest components were $35.3 billion in federal corporate income tax that congregations would owe if their donations were taxed as corporate income, $26.2 billion in property tax, and $6.18 billion in state income tax. The post also carried a header graphic giving an unsourced split of about $100 billion, including $26 billion for charitable deductions and two separate property-tax figures; it has been removed. The chart has been replaced with the estimate's own figures, and the post now says that the $100 billion working figure, an inflation adjustment of the 2012 estimate, does not include the donor deduction.
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The Difference Between Oversight and Gridlock: An earlier version of this post said the Senate minority party can block "all legislation, confirmations, and reforms." Since a 2013 Senate precedent, extended to Supreme Court nominations in 2017, a simple majority can end debate on any nomination, so the minority can slow confirmations but cannot block them by filibuster. The post now says the minority can block most legislation and reforms, and explains the change for nominations.
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The Difference Between Oversight and Gridlock: An earlier version of this post listed a "Pentagon Papers investigation of war conduct" as an example of congressional oversight. Congress did not investigate the Pentagon Papers, a classified Defense Department study of Vietnam War policy. In 1971 Senator Mike Gravel convened a Senate subcommittee meeting, read from the study and placed it in the public record. The example now describes that.
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Capitalism, Reintroduced: What It Is, What It Isn’t, and Why It’s Breaking Down: An earlier version of this post gave U.S. GDP in 2025 as about $29 trillion. That is roughly the 2024 figure; the Bureau of Economic Analysis puts current-dollar GDP for 2025 at about $30.8 trillion. The post now says about $30.8 trillion.
Corrected
Corrections Reform: What Works, What Fails, and What It Costs: An earlier version of this post gave the U.S. incarceration rate as around 580 per 100,000, a figure that does not match the government's statistics. The Bureau of Justice Statistics puts the rate at 550 per 100,000 U.S. residents of all ages, or 700 per 100,000 adults, at yearend 2023. The post now gives those figures.
Clarified
Corrections Reform: What Works, What Fails, and What It Costs: An earlier version of this post described $182 billion a year as total corrections system costs. That figure is the Prison Policy Initiative's 2017 estimate of the cost of mass incarceration to governments and families, which also includes policing, courts and costs paid by families. The post now describes it that way and adds that state and local governments spent $87 billion on corrections itself in 2021 (Urban Institute, from Census Bureau data). The chart's $182B bar, labeled "Total corrections costs," measures the same broader estimate, and a note under the chart now says so.
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Ranked-Choice Voting Explained: Why It Can Reduce Extremism: An earlier version of this post said the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) counts 16 states that prohibit ranked-choice voting. NCSL's brief, updated March 23, 2026, lists 19 states with prohibitions, 17 of them enacted before 2026 and two (Indiana and Ohio) in 2026. The post now gives the figure of 19 with that date.
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Why Prescription Drugs Cost More in the U.S. (and What Actually Lowers Prices): An earlier version of this post cited RAND's "International Prescription Drug Price Comparisons" (Figure ES-1) for the finding that brand-name prices drive the U.S. price gap, but linked to a different RAND report, "Comparing Insulin Prices in the United States to Other Countries" (RR-A788-1). Those citations now link to the price comparison report itself, "International Prescription Drug Price Comparisons: Estimates Using 2022 Data" (RR-A788-3, February 2024), published by the Department of Health and Human Services. It finds U.S. brand-name prices were 422 percent of prices in comparison countries, and unbranded generics cheaper in the U.S.
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Independent Redistricting Commissions: What They Change (and What They Don’t): An earlier version of this post described the Texas example as 2021 maps litigated into the 2026 cycle. Texas replaced its 2021 congressional map with a new map in 2025, before the challenge to the 2021 map was decided, and the Supreme Court allowed the 2025 map to be used in the 2026 elections. The post now refers to 2021 and 2025 maps.
Clarified
Jobs Added vs. Jobs People Want: Why the Numbers Don’t Match Reality: An earlier version of this post described the employment-population ratio chart as showing "participation." The chart shows the employment-population ratio, the share of people age 16 and over who have a job. The labor force participation rate is a different measure that also counts people who are looking for work. The caption now names the measure the chart shows.